



King's Research Portal

DOI:

[10.1080/1468274042000283144](https://doi.org/10.1080/1468274042000283144)

Document Version

Peer reviewed version

[Link to publication record in King's Research Portal](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Easter, D. (2006). "Keep the Indonesian pot boiling": Western covert intervention in Indonesia, October 1965-March 1966. *Cold War History*, (Routledge), 5(1), 55-73. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1468274042000283144>

Citing this paper

Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.

General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

'Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling': Western Covert Intervention in Indonesia, October 1965–March 1966

David Easter

This study examines the role played by the West in the destruction of the Indonesian communist party, the PKI, and the removal of the radical Indonesian president, Sukarno, in 1965–66. After the murder of six generals in October 1965 the Indonesian army massacred thousands of communists and seized power from Sukarno. The United States secretly helped the army in this period by providing intelligence, arms, medicines and radios and by giving assurances that Britain would not attack Indonesia while the army was suppressing the PKI. The US, Britain, Australia and Malaysia also used propaganda to encourage hostility in Indonesia towards the PKI. The article assesses the impact of Western covert intervention and concludes that Western propaganda may have encouraged the mass killings of the communists.

The changes that took place in Indonesia from October 1965 to March 1966 were a watershed in the history of South-East Asia and a major reverse for communism in the Cold War. Prior to October 1965 Indonesia was a radical Third World state. Its charismatic president, Sukarno, was a vocal anti-imperialist, dedicated to resisting what he called the *Nekolim* (neo-colonialists-imperialists) of the West. Sukarno openly aligned himself with the communist bloc in this struggle, proclaiming support for the North Vietnamese in the Vietnam War, establishing close ties with the People's Republic of China and angrily pulling Indonesia out of the United Nations in January 1965. Sukarno also tried to destabilize his pro-Western neighbour Malaysia through a campaign called 'Confrontation'. He denounced Malaysia as a British neo-colonialist creation and sponsored a guerrilla insurgency in the country. To leaders in Washington, London and Canberra, Sukarno appeared to be mounting a comprehensive challenge to Western interests in South-East Asia.

In internal affairs Sukarno was also moving Indonesia to the left. For many years there had been an uneasily balanced triangle of power in the country between Sukarno,

the staunchly anti-communist army and the large Indonesian communist party, the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*). During 1964–65 Sukarno increasingly favoured the PKI. Government propaganda campaigns created a siege mentality by warning of *Nekolim* ‘encirclement’ of Indonesia and alleging American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) plots to assassinate Sukarno. The president banned rival political parties to the PKI or allowed them to be taken over by the leftists. He also permitted the communists to gain control over most of the press and the Antara news agency.

It appeared that Sukarno, who was 64 years old and known to be in ill health, was creating the conditions for the PKI to take control in Indonesia after his death. Such an outcome would have been a major defeat for the West as Indonesia was a glittering geo-strategic prize. With a population of 103 million it was one of the largest countries in the world, it had abundant raw materials and the sprawling Indonesian island chain covered vital sea lanes. The loss of Indonesia would also outflank American efforts to contain communism in South Vietnam.

Events in the winter of 1965–66 completely transformed the situation. An abortive coup took place in Jakarta on 1 October, which, although unsuccessful, caused the death of six leading army generals. The Indonesian army blamed the coup attempt on the PKI and it retaliated with a ferocious campaign of repression against the party. An estimated 300,000–500,000 people were killed in an anti-communist Terror and the PKI was extinguished as a political force. The army leader, Suharto, then compelled Sukarno in March 1966 to hand over executive powers to him in what was effectively a military coup. Under Suharto’s leadership Indonesia moved sharply to the right, both domestically and internationally, making peace with Malaysia and breaking ties with China. Sukarno was marginalized and died while under house arrest in 1970.

This ‘reverse course’ in Indonesia was an important victory for the Western powers in the Cold War. It removed the spectre of a communist Indonesia and ended Sukarno’s troublesome anti-Malaysia campaign. Since the West was such an obvious beneficiary of the reverse course, there has been speculation as to whether the Western powers were actually responsible for it.¹ Peter Dale Scott has argued that the events of 1965–66 were in fact ‘a three phase right-wing coup – one which had been both publicly encouraged and secretly assisted by U.S. spokesmen and officials’.² Scott sees Suharto as the puppet master behind the reverse course, ‘inducing, or at a minimum helping to induce’ the October 1965 coup attempt and then using it as pretext to eliminate the PKI and remove Sukarno. In this conspiracy Scott believes Suharto had strong covert support from the United States, especially in areas like propaganda and secret aid to the Indonesian army. By contrast, the historian H.W. Brands has argued that Washington was not to blame for the changes in Indonesia.³ Examining the documentary sources Brands could find no evidence of American links to the October 1965 coup attempt and he claims that the United States only gave cautious and limited support to the army in the subsequent power struggle. In short, he thinks that ‘Sukarno’s overthrow had little to do with American machinations. It resulted instead from developments of essentially Indonesian origin’.⁴

Other writers have focused on Britain's role.⁵ The journalists Paul Lashmar and James Oliver claim in their book *Britain's Secret Propaganda War* that 'the British government secretly helped overthrow President Sukarno of Indonesia, assisting the rise of General Suharto ... to power'.⁶ Lashmar and Oliver draw on interviews with former Foreign Office officials to show that London mounted a covert propaganda campaign against Sukarno after the October 1965 coup attempt. However, Lashmar and Oliver provide little documentary proof and they also make bold claims about earlier Western plotting against Sukarno which are not supported by the evidence.⁷

This article will seek to answer the question of whether the West was responsible for the reverse course in Indonesia. Using British, Australian and American sources it will examine the covert role played by the West in the destruction of the Indonesian communist party and the ousting of Sukarno.

By the summer of 1965 there was a consensus amongst Britain, the United States, Australia and Malaysia, that Sukarno was an implacable enemy, threatening the stability of the region and leading his country to communism. Both the British and the Americans believed that the longer Sukarno remained in power the greater chance there was of a communist takeover in Indonesia after his death.⁸

The Western powers responded to this threat in a similar way: by using propaganda and covert action. For the three Commonwealth powers the immediate problem was Confrontation. Britain and Australia had committed substantial forces to defend Malaysia but for political reasons they were reluctant to openly retaliate for the Indonesian guerrilla raids. If, for example, the British and Australians bombed targets in Indonesia it would confirm to the Indonesian public Sukarno's warnings about the threat posed by the *Nekolim*. An open war between Britain, Australia and Indonesia could strengthen the position of the PKI and damage the prestige of the army, hastening moves towards a communist takeover. The Commonwealth allies therefore had to rely on covert pressures to make Indonesia halt Confrontation; British and Australian soldiers secretly crossed the jungle border to attack guerrilla units inside Indonesia and Britain and Malaysia gave aid to rebel groups in the outer Indonesian islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi.⁹

In addition, the British and Malaysians used covert propaganda to erode support for Confrontation and encourage disunity in Indonesia.¹⁰ In February 1965 the Information Research Department of the Foreign Office, which specialized in unattributable propaganda, set up the South East Asia Monitoring Unit in Singapore to carry out propaganda directed at Indonesian audiences.¹¹ London instructed that the propaganda from Singapore should undermine the will of the Indonesian armed forces to attack Malaysia, by representing that their real enemies were the PKI and communist China. Propaganda should also 'Discredit any potential successor to Sukarno ... whose accession to power might benefit the PKI'.¹² In July the Foreign Office decided to step up its propaganda operations by appointing a Political Warfare Coordinator in Singapore. Norman Reddaway, the Regional Information Officer in Beirut, was selected for the position, although Reddaway would not take up the post until November.¹³ Malaysian propaganda against Sukarno and the PKI was

disseminated overtly, through Radio Malaysia's external broadcasts to Indonesia, and covertly, through a 'black' radio station, 'Radio Free Indonesia', which masqueraded as the work of Indonesian émigrés.¹⁴

The United States' primary concern was the communist threat. In March 1965 the 303 Committee of the National Security Council approved a CIA–State Department political action programme to reduce the influence of the PKI and communist China and support non-communist elements in Indonesia.¹⁵ As part of the programme the US would 'develop black and grey propaganda themes for use within Indonesia and via appropriate media assets outside Indonesia'.¹⁶ The aim would be to 'Portray the PKI as an increasingly ambitious, dangerous opponent of Sukarno and legitimate nationalism and instrument of Chinese neo-imperialism'. The next month the United States effectively abandoned any attempt to work with Sukarno. The veteran American diplomat Ellsworth Bunker visited Sukarno in April but he could find no common ground – he came back convinced that the Indonesian leader 'was a Marxist at heart'.¹⁷ Bunker warned President Lyndon Johnson that the large and widespread American presence in Indonesia gave the PKI political targets to attack and allowed it to portray those who were friendly to the US, such as the army, as defenders and stooges of the imperialists. He therefore recommended that 'U.S. visibility should be reduced so that those opposed to the communists and extremists may be free to handle a confrontation, which they believe will come, without the incubus of being attacked as defenders of the neo-colonialists and imperialists'.¹⁸ The Americans should quietly keep in contact with 'the constructive elements of strength in Indonesia' and try to give these elements 'the most favourable conditions for confrontation [with the PKI]', although Bunker thought that Indonesia 'would essentially have to save itself'.

Washington put Bunker's recommendations into effect and adopted what one American official described as a 'low silhouette' policy.¹⁹ American diplomats and aid workers were pulled out and the visible US presence reduced. At the same time Washington tried to find ways to influence opinion in Indonesia. Plans were drawn up to improve Voice of America (VOA)'s signal to Indonesia by erecting ten transmitters at Clark Field air base in the Philippines.²⁰ In August US officials also held talks with the Australians in Canberra to discuss possible cooperation in broadcasts to Indonesia.²¹

It is clear, then, that by September 1965 the Western powers were hostile to Indonesia and trying to use propaganda to combat the PKI. But it was the coup attempt in Indonesia that gave them a real opportunity to do this. In the early hours of 1 October a group headed by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, a left-wing commander in the Presidential Guard, abducted and killed six leading Indonesian generals. Untung's troops also took over broadcasting facilities in Jakarta and announced the formation of a Revolutionary Council.

The Untung putsch swiftly collapsed. Its armed bands failed to capture the Defence Minister, General Naustion, although they did manage to fatally injure his six-year-old daughter, and Major General Suharto, commander of the army's strategic reserves, used his troops to regain control of the capital and crush the plotters. By 2 October

the coup was effectively over. What was less easily resolved and which remains a mystery to this day, is whether Untung was acting on behalf of other forces. There has been a welter of conflicting theories as to who was behind the coup attempt.²² Some on the right have blamed the PKI, Red China, the pro-communist Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio or even Sukarno. Others, such as Scott, have constructed an elaborate conspiracy theory that the coup attempt was an army provocation, led by Suharto, to give a pretext for a crack-down on the communists.

There is insufficient space here to assess all the conflicting theories of the coup's origins but looking at American, British and Australian primary sources it is apparent that despite their interest in covert action and propaganda, the Western powers were surprised by the coup attempt. In the first few days of October American, Australian and British diplomats in Jakarta were shocked and confused and had trouble in finding out what was going on.²³ There is no evidence that the coup attempt was a Western-backed army provocation. Indeed, on 1 October the American Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, told George Ball at the State Department that the CIA 'had had absolutely nothing to do with it'.²⁴ The immediate suspicion of Western officials was of a possible connection to the PKI.²⁵

Yet evidence for PKI involvement in the coup was not clear-cut. Communist transport and communications unions helped Untung on 1 October by cutting communications in and out of Jakarta and the next day a communist newspaper endorsed the action he had taken. The coup attempt was centred on the Halim air force base and made use of communist cadres being given military training there. But the PKI did not try to mobilize its massive party membership behind the coup and an American 'clandestine source' reported that the PKI central committee only decided to give Untung military support after hearing his radio broadcast on 1 October.²⁶ After the coup had failed the PKI denied any involvement and claimed it had been an internal army matter, with junior officers attacking senior officers.

Faced with this conflicting evidence, privately Western policymakers were uncertain how far the PKI was responsible for the abortive coup. US State Department officials believed that the PKI had not planned or engineered the coup attempt.²⁷ Instead they thought that Untung, without consulting the party, might have put into effect a communist contingency plan to seize power on the death of Sukarno. Certainly there had been a flurry of reports in August–September that the president was seriously ill and these could have sparked Untung into action. Once the coup was underway the PKI felt it had no choice but to get on board. Sir Andrew Gilchrist, the British Ambassador in Jakarta, suspected that the communists only became aware of Untung's plan at a late stage and joined in because they feared that if the army crushed Untung it would crush them as well.²⁸ The Australian Joint Intelligence Committee noted that while individual communist groups clearly participated in the coup, 'evidence of actual PKI involvement – that is of prior planning by the Central Committee – is largely circumstantial'.²⁹ By contrast, Marshall Green, the US Ambassador to Indonesia, was convinced that party chairman Aidit and other top PKI leaders 'were

almost certainly in on planning' the coup although he conceded that the 'PKI decision to participate seems to have been hurried one'.³⁰

If Western policymakers were unsure about the role of the communists the Indonesian army appeared to have no doubts and it pressed Sukarno for strong action against the PKI. However, the president tried to protect the PKI and he refused to ban the party. He promised a peaceful political settlement and called for national unity, warning that division would only benefit the *Nekolim*. Reportedly at a cabinet meeting on 6 October Sukarno and Subandrio blamed the coup attempt on the CIA and alleged that the CIA's aim was to spread confusion before an American and British invasion of Indonesia.³¹

The army, though, was not diverted by Sukarno's appeals for unity and it began to move against the PKI. It arrested communist cadres and encouraged anti-PKI demonstrations in Jakarta. It also tried to mobilize public opinion by taking control of the mass media.³² The army closed down the communist press while ensuring the continued publication of military newspapers such as *Angkatan Bersendjaja*, *Berita Yudha* and the English language *Jakarta Daily Mail*. It took control over Radio Indonesia and the Antara news agency, which was the main supplier of news carried by Indonesian radio stations and newspapers.

Through these outlets the army attacked the PKI and linked it to Untung's coup attempt. On 4 October an editorial in *Angkatan Bersendjaja* lambasted the PKI as 'devils' who were 'injecting poison into the Indonesian nation and the revolution'.³³ Two days later the paper claimed the coup attempt was masterminded by the PKI and called on the government to declare the party illegal.³⁴ One prominent theme in this propaganda campaign was the murder of the six Indonesian generals. The army-controlled media alleged that members of the PKI youth organization, Pemuda Rakjat, and the communist women's group, Gerwani, had brutally tortured the generals before killing them.³⁵ For example, on 10 October *Berita Yudha* reported that the generals' eyes had been gouged out. These claims were untrue. Although the generals' bodies had partially decomposed after being dumped in a well by the rebels, autopsies showed they had not been tortured or mutilated after death.³⁶ Nonetheless this story became a central feature of the army's propaganda campaign and a founding myth for the later Suharto regime.

In mid-October Suharto seems to have given approval for army units to deal with the PKI and the army rounded up and killed party members throughout the country. It also armed nationalist and Muslim groups, such as the Ansor Muslim youth organization, and encouraged them to eliminate the communists. The result was a wave of mass killings, spreading across Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi and into Bali by December and then onto Timor, Flores and Lombok.

News of the slaughter slowly reached Western diplomats in Jakarta, who had only limited information on what was happening outside the capital. On 9 November an Australian teacher returning from central Java reported 'All manner of atrocities, stakes through heads, eye gouging, live burials ... being freely committed by both sides'.³⁷ On 14 November an American missionary told her embassy of the massacre of

58 *D. Easter*

3,400 PKI activists by Ansor at Kediri, in East Java.³⁸ An Indonesian source informed the British air attaché that PKI men and women were being executed in very large numbers.³⁹ Often they were given knives and told to kill themselves. If they refused they were shot in the back. An American observer in Bali reported ‘many headless bodies encountered on roads’ and a traveller in Sumatra saw Muslim youth group members stop a bus, drag out numerous communist passengers and hack them to death.⁴⁰ In February 1966 a visiting Australian diplomat learnt that 250 PKI members had been killed in the town of Kupang in Timor.⁴¹ He was told by the chief of the Public Works Department in Kupang that

Torture was the customary prelude to death and was in fact carried out in the army establishment next door to his own home. The nightly executions, carried out just outside Kupang, were open to the public provided those who attended took part in the executions. The Army was in complete control of these operations.

Precisely how many were killed in the massacres is not known and may never be known. Estimates varied widely.⁴² In January 1966 Colonel Stamboul, an army liaison officer, confided to the British military attaches that the army had no exact idea of the death toll but he estimated 500,000. Others in the army put the figure far higher. Major-General Adjie, the fiercely anti-communist commander of the Siliwangi division in West Java, told the Australian military attaché that nearly two million were killed. Short of hard evidence Western governments were cautious on the scale of the bloodletting. In April 1966 the State Department thought that around 300,000 had died.⁴³ Even so, the violence from October 1965 to January 1966 would still rank as one of the largest mass killings of the twentieth century.

The army-controlled media in Indonesia did not report the massacres. Instead the media stoked up hatred of the communists by portraying them as sadistic murderers, intent on killing their opponents. It alleged that the coup attempt and the murder of the generals had been only the start of the communists’ plans for a reign of terror. Antara reported at the beginning of November that a list had been found in Garut of the names of hundreds of government officials the PKI had planned to kill if the coup had been a success.⁴⁴ In December the news agency ran a story that Aidit had offered party activists in Java 25 million rupiahs if they murdered more than 1,000 people on a PKI black-list.⁴⁵

Communist atrocity stories were also a prominent feature in the media.⁴⁶ In November Antara claimed that Pemuda Rakjat members in Sumatra had kidnapped two youths and tortured them for five days, removing eyes and cutting off hands and testicles, before killing them. Another Pemuda Rakjat gang in Sumatra was alleged to have attacked Muslims praying on the bank of a river and again tortured and murdered them. The moral depravity of the communists was emphasized in other ways: Antara reported on 8 December that Aidit had encouraged the Gerwani and Pemuda Rakjat killers of the generals to take part in ‘delirious sexual orgies’ for six months before the coup.⁴⁷ In December the *Jakarta Daily Mail* denounced the communists as ‘mentally and morally perverted creatures who consider slander,

abduction, mutilation and murder their way of life'.⁴⁸ The paper declared that there was no place for the PKI in God-fearing Indonesia and called on people to 'Cast out this spawn of hell root and branch'.

Such demonization of the PKI could only have fuelled the pogrom against the party. This is certainly what Sukarno feared. The Indonesian president tried to protect the communists from the massacres – he constantly called for calm and national unity, condemned the killings and threatened to punish by death those who used force against the PKI.⁴⁹ He also repeatedly warned the press not to incite the public with inflammatory articles and irresponsible reporting.⁵⁰ Sukarno and Subandrio both denied stories that the communists had tortured and mutilated the six generals during the coup.⁵¹ They pointed out that the general's death certificates had not mentioned any 'abnormalities'.

These efforts were in vain though. The army retained control of most of the media and it ensured that Sukarno's message did not get through to the Indonesian public. Newspapers and Antara frequently failed to publish the text of speeches by the president.⁵² Other papers, such as the *Jakarta Daily Mail*, carried commentaries which distorted Sukarno's remarks, to make them appear to add up to a case for destroying the PKI.⁵³ Sukarno was powerless in the face of the massacres.

During the period of repression the West gave covert support to the army. The Western powers had been greatly heartened by the events in Indonesia after 1 October. A real chance had appeared to smash the PKI and perhaps remove Sukarno, and the West was anxious that the army leaders fully seized the opportunity. As both the Australian and American embassies put it in telegrams on 5 October, it was 'now or never' for the army.⁵⁴ The key question was how the West could best encourage and help Suharto and Nasution. Any overt support was likely to be counterproductive as Sukarno and Subandrio would immediately denounce *Nekolim* interference in Indonesia. The West would therefore have to be circumspect in its approach.

For Green the priority was to smear the PKI's image through propaganda. On 5 October the ambassador had urged Washington to 'Spread the story of PKI's guilt, treachery and brutality', adding that this was 'perhaps the most needed immediate assistance we can give army if we can find way to do it without identifying it as sole or largely US effort'.⁵⁵ The State Department agreed. It had already begun a VOA and information programme connecting the PKI to the coup attempt.⁵⁶ Green appeared satisfied with the results. He cabled Washington on 7 November 'that VOA doing good job'.⁵⁷ There are also indications that the CIA carried out covert anti-PKI propaganda after the coup.⁵⁸

The Australians were also active in this field. After 1 October the Department of External Affairs gave daily guidance to Radio Australia over its broadcasts to Indonesia.⁵⁹ The Department stressed that Radio Australia should not give information to the Indonesian people that the army-controlled internal media would withhold, such as disavowals by the PKI of responsibility for the coup. Instead the station should highlight reports discrediting the PKI and showing its involvement in the Untung coup attempt. The station seems to have faithfully followed these

60 D. Easter

guidelines, for Keith Shann, the Australian Ambassador in Jakarta, was pleased with Radio Australia's output, describing it as 'generally good'.⁶⁰

For their part the Malaysians tried to blame the putsch on the communists and inflame popular feeling in Indonesia. For example, on 13 October a news commentator on Radio Malaysia read out an editorial from the Beirut newspaper *Lissan Al-Hal* which claimed that, 'without the slightest shade of doubt', the coup was contrived by the PKI.⁶¹ He recalled the murder of Naustion's daughter and 'the mutilated bodies of the six Muslim generals . . . who [were] dismembered, cut to small bits and thrown in a well'. Whipping up feelings further, the newsreader said 'Such atrocities against Muslims . . . cannot but make the blood boil in every Muslim heart . . . they open every Muslim eye to the dirty work which no communist lackey would hesitate to do whenever the master dictates'. The British were working on similar lines. The Foreign Office hoped to 'encourage anti-Communist Indonesians to more vigorous action in the hope of crushing Communism in Indonesia altogether'.⁶² The Information Research Department would stimulate broadcasts to Indonesia by the BBC, Radio Malaysia, Radio Australia and VOA. It would also try to disseminate propaganda through newspapers read in Indonesia such as the *Straits Times*. The same anti-PKI message was to be spread by more clandestine outlets, such as a 'black transmitter' (presumably Radio Free Indonesia) and 'IRD's regular newsletter', which seems to have been 'black' propaganda prepared in Singapore by the Information Research Department's South East Asia Monitoring Unit.⁶³ Suggested propaganda themes included 'PKI brutality in murdering Generals and families, Chinese interference, particularly arms shipments, PKI subverting Indonesia as the agents of foreign Communists'.⁶⁴ On 9 October the Foreign Office reported that it was mounting some 'short term unattributable ploys designed to keep the Indonesian pot boiling'.⁶⁵

British propaganda efforts were strengthened by the arrival in November of Norman Reddaway as Political Warfare Coordinator in Singapore. Reddaway received news on the situation in Indonesia from the embassy in Jakarta and from intelligence sources, which seem to have included signals intelligence, as Britain had broken the Indonesian ciphers.⁶⁶ He would then supply information that suited British purposes to news agencies, newspapers and radio via contacts in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Hong Kong. This news would be carried out into the world's media and return to Indonesia, allowing Britain to influence Indonesian opinion. The reports were designed to damage the communists. A draft Foreign Office brief in late November explained that Britain had been 'blackening the PKI's reputation within Indonesia and outside, by feeding into the ordinary publicity media news from Indonesia that associates the PKI and the Chinese with Untung's treachery plus corresponding covert activity'. Thus, despite some private doubts over communist responsibility for the coup attempt, all four Western powers used the media to pin the blame on the PKI and discredit the party in Indonesia. This propaganda offensive supported the army's own activities, as the stories on VOA, Radio Malaysia, Radio Australia and the BBC and in the press confirmed the stories in the army-controlled media. The synergy between the two

publicity campaigns was not accidental. The British and Americans recycled reports from Radio Jakarta or the army newspapers by broadcasting them back to Indonesia.⁶⁷ For example, on 5 November the *Jakarta Daily Mail* claimed that on the day of the coup 100 women from Gerwani had tortured one of the generals by using razor blades and knives to slash his genitals before he was shot.⁶⁸ In December an Information Research Department official noted that this atrocity story would be included in the South East Asia Monitoring Unit's propaganda output.⁶⁹

Furthermore the Indonesian army actively advised the Western powers on the themes they should or should not use in their propaganda. On 2–3 November Indonesian Brigadier-General Sukendro had secret talks in Bangkok with Dato Ghazali Shafie, the Permanent Secretary at the Malaysian Ministry of External Affairs.⁷⁰ Sukendro said that Radio Malaysia should not give the army 'too much credit' or criticize Sukarno but should emphasize PKI atrocities and the party's role in the coup. Sukendro also asked for help in 'the character and political assassination' of Subandrio and offered to send background information on the Foreign Minister which could be used by the Malaysians. On 5 November an Indonesian military contact also approached the Americans and warned them against broadcasts that implied approval of army actions.⁷¹ An officer in the army information section told Shann that Radio Australia should never suggest that the army was pro-Western or rightist and should mention other organizations, such as Muslim and youth groups, opposing the PKI.⁷²

As well as using propaganda against the PKI the Western powers helped the army in other ways. The Americans set up a back-channel link to the army leaders through Colonel Willis Ethel, the US Army Attaché in Jakarta, who regularly met with an aide to Nasution. Through this channel the Americans reassured the Indonesian army about British activities and intentions, for although these two groups shared a common interest in the removal of the communists, because of the Confrontation the army was suspicious of Britain. The mistrust could reach ludicrous levels. In mid-October Nasution's aide quizzed Ethel about reports of British arms shipments to the PKI and asked whether the coup could have been a plot by Britain and communist China.⁷³ To Washington these bizarre ideas showed the 'somewhat naïve international view' of the army leaders, but they genuinely seemed to suspect a conspiracy between London and Beijing.⁷⁴ Ethel had to assure them that Britain had not colluded with the Chinese and the PKI.⁷⁵

Ethel also gave a broader assurance that Britain would not escalate the Confrontation while the army was dealing with the communists. With the approval of London, on 14 October Ethel told Nasution's aide that the British did not intend to start any offensive military action.⁷⁶ In early November the British and Australians reinforced this message.⁷⁷ Counsellor James Murray promised General Mokoginta, the Commander of Indonesian Armed Forces in Sumatra, that Britain had no intention of stepping up the Confrontation while the army was engaged with the PKI. Gilchrist and Shann said the same thing to Helmi, an Under-Secretary at the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who was close to the army. Shann declared that the army 'would be completely safe in using their forces for whatever purpose they saw fit'.⁷⁸

The Indonesian army could suppress the communists without worrying about British and Australian operations in the Confrontation.

In addition, the Americans secretly gave the army material aid. At the end of October Sukendro asked the US for medical supplies, communications equipment, rice and small arms to support the army's campaign against the PKI.⁷⁹ Washington was willing to help but it knew that there were major political risks involved. If American aid was exposed Sukarno and Subandrio would have proof of *Nekolim* interference in Indonesian internal affairs and this would seriously embarrass both the United States and the army. So the Americans moved carefully. On 12 November the State Department informed the British and Australians that the US had agreed to send \$100,000-worth of medical supplies to the Indonesian army via covert channels.⁸⁰ The 303 Committee also agreed on 19 November to give the army leaders a secure communications system, to maintain contact with each other and with 'U.S. elements'.⁸¹ In interviews in 1981–82 Sukendro confirmed that the US had secretly supplied medicines, radios and small arms through the Bangkok CIA station.⁸² Money may have been provided as well – in December Green recommended a 'black bag' operation giving 50 million rupiahs to Adam Malik, a key figure in KAP-Gestapu, an army-inspired action group that organized anti-PKI demonstrations.⁸³

Finally, the US supplied the army with intelligence.⁸⁴ The American embassy in Jakarta had compiled lists of names of the PKI leadership and senior cadres and, according to Green, this information was superior to anything held by the Indonesian army. After the coup attempt embassy officials passed on to the army lists of names of known PKI leaders. The army could use this information to round up key communists and dismantle the party structure.

The actions taken by the army in suppressing the communists did seem to trouble the consciences of some of the Western ambassadors in Jakarta. In a telegram to Canberra on 19 December Shann wrote that 'In many cases the massacre of entire families because one member spoke to the Communists, has occurred. Some of the methods adopted are unspeakable ... [It has been] a blood-bath of savage intensity, remarkably unpublicised and locally regarded with a ghoulis cynicism'.⁸⁵ Gilchrist asked Reddaway in February 1966 'What have we to hope from the [Indonesian] generals? 400,000 people murdered, far more than total casualties in Vietnam + nobody cares. "They were communists." Were they? And are communists not human beings?'⁸⁶

Yet the massacre of thousands of communists did not affect Western policy. The logic of the Cold War meant that the army was fulfilling the Western interest by eliminating the PKI and removing the danger of Indonesia falling to communism. The army was also the only means to dispose of Sukarno and end the Confrontation. Therefore, despite distaste for the army's methods, the West still wanted to support it. The main problem for this policy was not ethical concerns but the fear that overt aid could embarrass the army in its power struggle with Sukarno and Subandrio. On 1–2 December 1965 American, Australian, British and New Zealand officials held secret

Quadripartite talks to coordinate policy towards Indonesia.⁸⁷ The mass killings were not even mentioned. Instead the officials discussed the difficulties in helping the army while Sukarno and Subandrio remained in power. The West still had to take care not to make the army appear to be *Nekolim* stooges and for this reason it was agreed at the meeting that 'except for some cautious propaganda (on lines already agreed) we should take no initiative at this moment to help the Generals'.

There was another reason why the West would not offer greater aid, especially economic aid: the army did not seem to want it. In November Sukendro had raised the possibility of the US and Malaysia giving rice, which was in short supply in some areas in Indonesia.⁸⁸ But by the middle of December the army leaders seemed to have abandoned this idea. On 13 December Malik told Green that there was an urgent need for food and clothing in Indonesia but Suharto and Nasution wanted to let Sukarno and Subandrio 'stew in their own juice'.⁸⁹ Economic mismanagement hurt the civilian government, not the army, and if the situation worsened Sukarno and Subandrio would be blamed. Malik advised the US not to give aid yet.

Malik's prediction about the effects of economic distress soon came true. To try and rescue the floundering economy in mid-December Sukarno's government devalued the rupiah by an order of 1,000 and then quadrupled fuel prices in early January.⁹⁰ These harsh fiscal measures provoked mass student protests. An Indonesian Student Action Front, composed mainly of Muslim and nationalist students, organized demonstrations. They linked economic discontent to political protest, demanding not just a reduction in prices but also the removal of left-wing ministers, such as Subandrio, and the formal banning of the PKI. The army gave covert assistance to the students, transporting them to demonstrations and protecting them. The army leaders saw the student protests as a way to undermine Sukarno's rule and ease him and Subandrio from office.

In their campaign the army and students again received propaganda support from the West. Reddaway reported on 11 February that:

We have ... stepped up our efforts. The Malaysian black radio is taking our tapes, material written by us in Djakarta is appearing in Middle East Muslim newspapers and being repeated by Radio Malaysia so that Indonesians hear it. The newsletter undoubtedly continues to get through and be read. We pick up anti-Subandrio propaganda circulated within Indonesia and get it published world-wide via news agencies in Hong Kong.⁹¹

On 21 February Sukarno tried to reassert his authority by reshuffling his cabinet and sacking Nasution as Defence Minister. But this move backfired. It triggered off even larger student demonstrations, again abetted by the army, and on 11 March troops mounted a show of force outside Sukarno's palace. Under this pressure Sukarno yielded and he signed a letter of authority handing over executive power to Suharto. Although Sukarno remained nominally in charge real power was now in the hands of the army.

The Western allies were delighted with the army's seizure of power. An American official explained to President Johnson on 12 March that:

It is hard to overestimate the potential significance of the army's apparent victory over Sukarno (even though the latter remains as a figurehead). Indonesia has more people – and probably more resources – than all of mainland Southeast Asia. It was well on the way to becoming another expansionist Communist state, which would have critically menaced the rear of the whole Western position in mainland Southeast Asia. Now, though the unforeseen can always happen, this trend has been sharply reversed.⁹²

The pro-communist trend had indeed been reversed. During the remainder of 1966 and 1967 Suharto moved methodically to undo all of Sukarno's policies. He banned the PKI, detained Subandrio, ended Confrontation with Malaysia, rejoined the United Nations and froze relations with communist China. Sukarno was stripped of his remaining powers and died in obscurity. Indonesia was saved for the West.

The question remains of how far the Western powers were responsible for this outcome. Did Western covert intervention in Indonesia cause the destruction of the PKI and the removal of Sukarno? The origins of the coup attempt in October 1965 remain obscure but on the evidence from currently available American, Australian and British archives it does not seem to have been a Western-inspired or -supported plot. Certainly the West gave covert support to the army after the coup but it appears, as Brands argues, that the indigenous actors were the key to events in Indonesia from October 1965 to March 1966. It was the army that chose to crush the communists and topple Sukarno's government. While the attitude of the West may have encouraged the army to move against the PKI it probably did not need much encouragement. Nasution, for example, whose daughter had been murdered in the coup, had reasons enough of his own. The United States did help the army by providing radios, medicine, small arms and lists of names and by giving assurances that Britain would not escalate the Confrontation, but this support was not essential to the army's success.

Western propaganda may have been of more importance in bringing down Sukarno's regime and in inciting the massacre of the communists. The documentary sources do, for example, corroborate a lot of Lashmar and Oliver's revelations about British covert propaganda operations in 1965–66. The influence of the West on the anti-communist Terror should not be exaggerated though. The killings were not just political acts in the Cold War, they were also a complex sociological phenomenon and the perpetrators had a wide variety of local motives.⁹³ The PKI had supported land reform in rural areas and this had created bitter resentment between peasant party members and small landlords. Muslims and, in Bali, Hindus were driven by religious fervour to slaughter the atheist communists. The killings sometimes had racial overtones, such as attacks on ethnic Chinese in North Sumatra. In the frenzy of violence people saw a chance to satisfy personal vendettas. Other factors than propaganda drove civilians to murder suspected communists. The killings were not just a reaction to Western propaganda – they were the culmination of years of built up tension and hatred.

It can also be questioned how large the audience for Western propaganda actually was. Australian officials believed that the only about 60 per cent of the adult Indonesian population was literate and the number of newspaper readers was thought to be just 500,000.⁹⁴ Radio was a more important source of news but the number of listeners was still limited. Radio Indonesia estimated in 1963 that there were 3.5 million radio sets in the country with an effective listenership of 17 million, but this might have been an underestimate, as one radio set could be listened to by a large number in a small village which had no other sources of information.

Of the foreign radio stations Radio Australia was generally agreed to be the most popular, indeed an army officer told the Australians in September 1965 that Radio Australia was more popular than Radio Indonesia.⁹⁵ It was listened to by the elite – Nasution was said to be a regular listener – and by students, who liked it because it played rock music, which had been officially banned in Indonesia. The BBC Indonesian service had far fewer listeners and was dismissed in an Information Research Department report in June 1965 as being ‘probably only of marginal value’.⁹⁶ Voice of America suffered from having a weak signal and was difficult to hear.⁹⁷ Green complained to Washington on 19 October 1965 about the ‘appalling inadequacy of VOA signal to Indonesia’ and called for emergency measures to give a clear reception.⁹⁸ Radio Malaysia was audible, but in the opinion of Gilchrist it was not trusted by Indonesians and therefore had no great influence.⁹⁹ The audiences of the West’s covert propaganda outlets are impossible to gauge, but judging by the relatively few newspaper readers and radio listeners in Indonesia, Western propaganda may have only been able to reach and affect a limited number of people.

Nevertheless, there are signs that Western propaganda may have had an impact. The Indonesian government seemed to notice the propaganda campaign and feel threatened by it. In a speech in January 1966 Sukarno declared those unhappy with his leadership should say so openly and ‘not carry out campaigns of secret slander inspired by Nekolim to bring about his downfall’.¹⁰⁰ In February an editorial in the *Indonesian Herald* newspaper, which acted as the mouthpiece for Subandrio’s Foreign Ministry, warned of a ‘Necolim psywar’ being used to ‘subdue our revolution’.¹⁰¹

On the other side, British officials believed that their propaganda had been effective. Gilchrist wrote in April 1966 that military and political propaganda pressure on Indonesia ‘has had no small effect in breaking up the Soekarno regime’.¹⁰² Reportedly, Sir John Grandy, the British Commander in Chief in the Far East, thought Reddaway’s propaganda work ‘made an outstanding contribution to the campaign against the Indonesians’.¹⁰³

The explanations ordinary Indonesians gave for the massacres also appeared to show the influence of propaganda. Western journalists travelling in Java and Bali in the spring and summer of 1966 observed that people repeatedly justified the killings as self-defence. Seymour Topping wrote in the *New York Times* that ‘Many Indonesians say bluntly “It was them or us”’.¹⁰⁴ He heard rumours in the towns of the PKI digging mass graves prior to the coup and PKI files naming high-ranking army officers, local officials and religious leaders that were to be executed. Stanley Karnow reported in

the *Washington Post* that ‘Everywhere . . . people sought to justify the destruction of the Communists with the same phrase “If we hadn’t done it to them they would have done it to us”’.¹⁰⁵ He believed this pervasive attitude was largely due to the ‘the brutal fashion in which the Communists murdered [the] six army generals’. Dennis Warner, quoted an Indonesian in *The Sydney Morning Herald* as saying ‘I think the murder of the generals and Nasution’s daughter had such an impact on us all, especially when we learnt what was in store for the rest of us, that no one had any sympathy for the PKI’.¹⁰⁶

Clearly, some of the themes of the propaganda campaign are present here but there is a difficulty in separating out the effects of internal army propaganda from Western propaganda, as both were conveying the same message. It is likely that Western propaganda played a secondary, supporting role. The news coming from abroad would have confirmed the stories Indonesians were hearing at home – that the PKI had masterminded the coup, that communist women tortured and murdered the six generals, that the communists had planned to massacre their enemies. Western propaganda helped build up the picture of the communists as menacing, bloodthirsty killers that needed to be eradicated. The impact of this campaign was to dehumanize the communists and make it easier to murder them. As one Indonesian civilian, who executed 18 communists, put it to a journalist in 1966 ‘I did not kill people. I killed wild animals’.¹⁰⁷ To this extent Western covert intervention may have encouraged the massacres in Indonesia in the winter of 1965–66.

Notes

- [1] Scott, ‘The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno’.
- [2] *Ibid.*, 239.
- [3] Brands, ‘The Limits of Manipulation’.
- [4] *Ibid.*, 787.
- [5] Lashmar and Oliver, *Britain’s Secret Propaganda War*, 1–10.
- [6] *Ibid.*, 1.
- [7] Lashmar and Oliver allege that in 1962 the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and the American President John Kennedy secretly agreed to ‘liquidate’ Sukarno. This allegation was recently repeated in Blum, *Killing Hope*. The original basis for this claim is a partially declassified CIA document, Declassified Documents Referencing Service (DDRS), British Library of Political and Economic Science, 1975, Item 240A, CIA Report CS-3/522,563, 17 September 1962. In this document the writer does claim that Macmillan and Kennedy had agreed to liquidate Sukarno. However, although the document has been partially sanitized, it is fairly clear that it is a report from an Indonesian diplomat or intelligence officer which had been obtained by the CIA (the writer tells a Pakistani diplomat that Pakistan should leave the Western bloc and become neutralist; he interchangeably refers to Indonesia and ‘we’ buying parachutes from Pakistan). Furthermore the writer’s claim about the Kennedy–Macmillan plot is, by his own admission, based on ‘impressions I have received in conversations with Western diplomats’ and not on hard evidence. The document might illustrate Indonesian fears about Western intentions but it offers no proof of an Anglo-American plot in 1962 to liquidate Sukarno.

- [8] The National Archives (TNA) (Public Records Office) CAB 148/19 OPD(65) 25, 26 January 1965; National Intelligence Memorandum NIE 54/55-65, 1 July 1965, *FRUS, Indonesia 1964–68*, vol. 26, 270–71.
- [9] Easter, 'British and Malaysian Covert Support'.
- [10] Easter, 'British Intelligence and Propaganda'.
- [11] TNA FO 1101/1, Minute 'War of nerves Indonesia', not dated.
- [12] Easter, 'British Intelligence and Propaganda', 93–4.
- [13] TNA FO 371/187587, Minute Stanley to Edmonds, 17 June 1966; TNA FO 371/181530, Telegram 2645 Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) to Kuala Lumpur, 19 October 1965.
- [14] TNA DEFE 28/144, Minute Drew to PS/Minister, 19 December 1963; TNA FO 953/2140, Telegram 2380 Kuala Lumpur to CRO, 25 October 1963.
- [15] Political Action Paper, 19 November 1964; Memorandum for 303 Committee, 23 February 1965, *FRUS, 'Indonesia'*, 181–84; 234–37.
- [16] Memorandum for 303 Committee, 23 February 1965, *FRUS, 'Indonesia'*, 234–7.
- [17] TNA FO 371/180337, Despatch 10342/65 Stewart to Peck, 26 April 1965.
- [18] Report from Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to President Johnson, not dated, *FRUS, 'Indonesia'*, 256.
- [19] National Archives of Australia (NAA) A1838/555/1/9/1 Part 1, 'Overseas broadcasts to Indonesia. Discussions with United States' officials', Canberra 3–4 August 1965, not dated; Bunnell, 'American "Low Posture" Policy towards Indonesia'.
- [20] NAA A1838/555/1/9/1 Part 1, Telegram 2122 Washington to Department of External Affairs (DEA), 22 June 1965.
- [21] *Ibid.*, 'Overseas Broadcasts to Indonesia. Discussions with United States' Officials', Canberra 3–4 August 1965, not dated.
- [22] For an examination of the different theories see Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, 97–134, and Elson, *Suharto*, 110–18.
- [23] DDRS, Retrospective Collection, Item 605D, Telegram 800 Jakarta to Washington, 1 October 1965; NAA A6364/4 JA 1965/07, Telegram 1149, Jakarta to Canberra, 1 October 1965; TNA FO 371/180317, Gilchrist to Foreign Office (FO), 3 October 1965.
- [24] *FRUS, 'Indonesia'*, 301 footnote.
- [25] TNA FO 371/180317, Telegram Guidance 398 CRO to Kuala Lumpur, 4 October 1965; NAA A1838/3034/2/18/8 Part 1, Telegram 3445 Washington to DEA, 4 October 1965.
- [26] DDRS, Retrospective Collection, Item 29C, CIA Office of Central Intelligence, OCI No 2342/65, 28 October 1965.
- [27] NAA A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 1, Telegram 3445 Washington to DEA, 4 October 1965; Telegram 3442 Washington to DEA, 4 October 1965.
- [28] TNA FO 371/180320, Despatch DH1015/2/5 Gilchrist to Stewart, 19 October 1965.
- [29] NAA A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 7, Note 'Indonesia, PKI Responsibility for the Attempted Coup', 9 December 1965.
- [30] Telegram 1184 Jakarta to State Dept, 26 October 1965, *FRUS, 'Indonesia'*, 335–7.
- [31] DDRS Retrospective Collection, Item 28E, Telegram CIA/OCI 12980 Jakarta to Washington, 6 October 1965; Retrospective Collection, Item 29A, Telegram CIA/OCI 13185 Jakarta to Washington, 8 October 1965.
- [32] NAA A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 1, Telegram 1156 Shann to DEA, 2 October 1965; NAA A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 2, UPI report 274, 11 October 1965; NAA A6364/JA1965/015 Political Savingram 52, Jakarta to DEA, 15 October 1965; TNA FO 371/180317, Telegram 2083 Gilchrist to FO, 8 October 1965.
- [33] NAA A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 1, Telegram 1169 Jakarta to DEA, 5 October 1965.
- [34] TNA FO 371/180317, Telegram 2061 Gilchrist to FO, 6 October 1965.
- [35] Anderson, 'How did the Generals Die?'

68 D. Easter

- [36] Ibid. Simons, *Indonesia: The Long Oppression*, 173–4.
- [37] NAA A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 5, Record of a conversation with Marietta Smith, 9 November 1965.
- [38] DDRS Retrospective Collection, Item 615C, Telegram 171 Surabaya to Jakarta, 14 November 1965.
- [39] TNA FO 371/180325, Letter by Charney, 24 November 1965.
- [40] Lyndon Johnson National Security Files (NSF), Kings College, London, Reel 8 634–6, Telegram 1814 Jakarta to State Dept, 21 December 1965; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 December 1965.
- [41] NAA A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 11, Despatch Starey to DEA, 25 February 1966.
- [42] NAA A1838/3034/1 Part 2, Visit to Indonesian Military Establishments 20–27 June 1966 by Warner, 30 June 1966. TNA FO 371/186027, Despatch 1011/66 Jakarta to FO, 13 January 1966.
- [43] NAA A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 13 Memo No 601/66 Birch to DEA, 19 April 1966.
- [44] TNA FO 371/180322, Telegram 2426 Jakarta to FO, 3 November 1965.
- [45] NAA A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 8, UPI report 284, 18 December 1965.
- [46] TNA FO 371/180323, Cambridge to Tonkin, 9 November 1965; Telegram 2528 Gilchrist to FO, 13 November 1965.
- [47] NAA A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 7, UPI report 264, 8 December 1965; UPI report 265, 8 December 1965.
- [48] TNA FO 371/180325, *Jakarta Daily Mail*, 11 December 1965.
- [49] NAA A1209/1965/6674 Part 1, Telegram 1278 Jakarta to DEA, 22 October 1965; Telegram 1294 Jakarta to DEA, 26 October 1965; NAA A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 8, UPI report 10, 17 December 1965.
- [50] NAA A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 5, UPI report 96, 10 November 1965; NAA A6364/JA1965/015, Savingram 59, Jakarta to DEA, 25 November 1965.
- [51] NAA A1838/3006/4/9 Part 30, Interview Subandrio and Hastings, 15 December 1965; NAA A6364/JA1965/015, Savingram 62 Jakarta to DEA, 17 December 1965.
- [52] DDRS Retrospective Collection, Item 611C, Telegram 1195 Jakarta to State Dept, 25 October 1965; NAA A1838/3034/2/1 Part 48, Macdonnell to Ottawa, 18 November 1965.
- [53] NAA A6364/JA1965/015, Savingram 64 Jakarta to DEA, 23 December 1965.
- [54] DDRS Retrospective Collection, Item 28C, Telegram CIA/OCI 12848 Jakarta to Washington, 5 October 1965; NAA A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 1, Telegram 1172, Shann to DEA, 5 October 1965.
- [55] Telegram 868 Green to State Dept, 5 October 1965, *FRUS*, 'Indonesia', 307–8.
- [56] Telegram 400 State Dept to Jakarta, 6 October 1965, *ibid.*, 308–10.
- [57] DDRS Retrospective Collection, Item 613A, Telegram 1353 Jakarta to State Dept, 7 November 1965.
- [58] McGehee, *Deadly Deceits*, 57–8.
- [59] NAA A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 3, Minute Hay to Minister, 18 October 1965.
- [60] *Ibid.*; Najjarine and Cottle, 'The Department of External Affairs'.
- [61] TNA FO 371/180320, Radio Malaysia 2140 hours News Commentary, 13 October 1965.
- [62] TNA DEFE 25/170, Telegram 1863 FO to Singapore, 8 October 1965.
- [63] TNA FO 371/187587, Adams to de la Mare, attached diagram, 2 June 1966.
- [64] TNA FO 371/181455, Telegram 2679 CRO to Canberra, 13 October 1965.
- [65] TNA FO 371/181530, Telegram 1460 Stanley to Reddaway, 9 October 1965.
- [66] Easter, 'British Intelligence and Propaganda', 85; TNA FO1101/5, Minute Reddaway to Tovey, 30 October 1965.
- [67] TNA FO 371/181455, Minute Stanley to Cable, 7 October 1965; Telegram 2679 CRO to Canberra, 13 October 1965.
- [68] TNA FO 371/180324, Despatch DH 1015/311 Jakarta to FO, 22 November 1965.

- [69] Ibid. Minute by Weilland, 22 December 1965.
- [70] TNA FO 371/181457, Record of meeting between Ghazali and Sukendro on 2–3 November 1965, 10 November 1965.
- [71] Lyndon Johnson NSF, Reel 8, 338–9, Telegram 1357 Jakarta to Washington, 5 November 1965.
- [72] NAA A6364/JA1965/10, Telegram 1340 Shann to Canberra, 5 November 1965.
- [73] DDRS Retrospective Collection, Item 610B, Telegram 497 State Dept to Jakarta, 21 October 1965; Johnson NSF, Reel 8, 251–2, Telegram 1139 Jakarta to State Dept, 22 October 1965.
- [74] Intelligence Memorandum OCI No 2942/65, 18 November 1965, *FRUS*, 'Indonesia', 372.
- [75] DDRS Retrospective Collection, Item 611D, Telegram 526 State Dept to Jakarta, 26 October 1965; Johnson NSF Reel 8, 288–289, Telegram 1201, Jakarta to State Dept, 26 October 1965.
- [76] Telegram unnumbered, Jakarta to State Dept, 10 October 1965; Telegram 1006 Jakarta to State Dept, 14 October 1965, *FRUS*, 'Indonesia', 317–18; 321–2.
- [77] TNA FO 371/181457, Record of Conversation with General Mokoginta by James Murray, 9 November 1965; Telegram 2509 Gilchrist to FO, 12 November 1965.
- [78] NAA A6364/JA1965/10, Telegram 1383 Shann to DEA, 12 November 1965.
- [79] Telegram 1288 Jakarta to State Dept, 1 November 1965, *FRUS*, 'Indonesia', 345–7.
- [80] Telegram 749 State Dept to Bangkok, 4 November 1965; Telegram 951 Bangkok to State Dept, 11 November 1965, *ibid.*, 357–8; 364–6.
- [81] Memorandum for 303 Committee, 17 November 1965, *ibid.*, 368–71.
- [82] Bunnell, 'American "Low Posture" Policy towards Indonesia', 59, footnote. On the supply of radios see also a letter from the journalist Kathy Kadane to the Editor, *New York Review of Books*, 10 April 1997.
- [83] Telegram 1628 Jakarta to State Dept, 2 December 1965, *FRUS*, 'Indonesia', 379–80.
- [84] Editorial Note, *ibid.*, 386–7; Article by Kathy Kadane in *San Francisco Examiner*, 20 May 1990.
- [85] NAA A6364/JA1965/10, Telegram 1503 Jakarta to DEA, 19 December 1965.
- [86] TNA FO 1101/30, Gilchrist to Reddaway, 9 February 1966.
- [87] NAA A1209/1968/9055, Memorandum by Eastman for DEA, 9 December 1966.
- [88] TNA FO 371/181457, Record of meeting Ghazali and Sukendro on 2–3 November 1965, 10 November 1965; Telegram 1288 Jakarta to State Dept, 1 November 1965, *FRUS*, 'Indonesia', 345–7.
- [89] NAA A1838 3034/2/1/8 Part 8, Telegram 8 Washington to DEA, 4 January 1966; Memorandum of conversation, 14 February 1966, *FRUS*, 'Indonesia', 399–401.
- [90] NAA A1838 3034/2/1/8 Part 7, UPI report 284, 14 December 1965. NAA A1838 3034/2/1/8 Part 8, UPI report 230, 4 January 1966.
- [91] TNA FO 1101/23, Minute by Reddaway, 11 February 1966. Reddaway's comments suggest that the editorial in *Lissan Al-Hal* broadcast by Radio Malaysia on 13 October 1965 may have been British-inspired.
- [92] Memorandum Komer to Johnson, 12 March 1966, *FRUS*, 'Indonesia', 419.
- [93] Cribb, *The Indonesian Killings 1965–1966*.
- [94] NAA A1838/3034/1 Part 2, 'Head of Mission Meeting, Bangkok, December 1965, Indonesia', not dated. NAA A1838/570/5/1/4 Part 1, Upton to DEA, not dated.
- [95] NAA A1838/555/1/9 Part 2, Conversation Sofjan and Jackson, 21 September 1965; NAA A1838/555/1/9/1 Part 1, Memorandum 'Radio Australia Indonesian Audience', by Barnett, not dated; TNA FO1101/1, Gilchrist to Reddaway, 11 August 1965.
- [96] TNA FO1101/1, Report by Drinkall, 3 June 1965. Audience figures were assessed by the number of letters the station received from Indonesian listeners. While Radio Australia received 16,000 letters a month, the BBC Indonesia service received 4,000 letters a year. NAA A1838 555/1/9 Part 2, Memorandum 'Australian information policy towards Indonesia', not dated; TNA FO1101/11, Reddaway to Commander in Chief, 3 March 1966.

70 *D. Easter*

- [97] NAA A1838/555/1/9/1 Part 1, Telegram 2069 Washington to DEA, 17 June 1965.
- [98] DDRS Retrospective Collection, Item 609G, Telegram 1086 Jakarta to State Dept, 19 October 1965.
- [99] TNA FO1101/1, Gilchrist to Reddaway, 11 August 1965.
- [100] NAA A1838/3034/2/1/8 Part 9, Savingram 3 Jakarta to DEA, 19 January 1965.
- [101] TNA FO1101/23, *Indonesian Herald*, 3 February 1966.
- [102] TNA FO 371/186044, Despatch 5 Gilchrist to Stewart, 12 April 1966.
- [103] TNA FO 1101/32, Telegram 205 POLAD Singapore to Bangkok, 26 September 1966.
- [104] *New York Times*, 24 August 1966.
- [105] *Washington Post*, 16 April 1966.
- [106] *Sydney Morning Herald*, 15 June 1966.
- [107] *The Australian*, 22 April 1966.

References

- Anderson, B. "How Did the Generals Die?" *Indonesia* 43 (1987): 109–34.
- Brands, H.W. "The Limits of Manipulation: How the United States didn't Topple Sukarno." *Journal of American History* 76, no. 3 (1989): 785–808.
- Blum, William. *Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since World War 2*. London: Zed Books, 2003.
- Bunnell, F. "American "Low Posture" Policy towards Indonesia in the Months Leading Up to the 1965 Coup." *Indonesia* 50 (1990): 29–60.
- Cribb, R., ed. *The Indonesian Killings 1965–1966: Studies from Java and Bali*. Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1991.
- Crouch, Harold. *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978.
- Easter, David. "British and Malaysian Covert Support for Rebel Movements in Indonesia during the "Confrontation", 1963–66." In *The Clandestine Cold War in Asia 1945–65*, edited by R. Aldrich, G. Rawnsley, and M. Rawnsley. London: Frank Cass, 2000, pp. 195–208.
- "British Intelligence and Propaganda during the "Confrontation" 1963–66." *Intelligence and National Security* 16, no. 2 (2001): 83–102.
- Elson, R. *Suharto: A Political Biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Lashmar, Paul and Oliver James. *Britain's Secret Propaganda War*. Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998.
- McGehee, R. *Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA*. New York: Sheridan Square Press, 1983.
- Najjarine, K. and D. Cottle. "The Department of External Affairs, the ABC and Reporting of the Indonesian Crisis 1965–1969." *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 49, no. 1 (2003): 48–60.
- Scott, Paul. "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965–67." *Pacific Affairs* 58, no. 2 (1985): 239–64.
- Simons, G. *Indonesia: The Long Oppression*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.
- US Senate. *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). Indonesia 1964–68*. vol. 26. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2001.

Author Query Sheet

Manuscript Information	
Journal Acronym	FCWH
Volume and issue	5-1
Author name	03 Easter
Manuscript No. (if applicable)	

AUTHOR: The following queries have arisen during the editing of your manuscript. Please answer the queries by marking necessary corrections **at the appropriate positions on the PROOFS. Do not answer the queries on the query sheet itself. Please also return a copy of the query sheet with your corrected proofs.**

QUERY NO.	QUERY DETAILS
-----------	---------------

1	Need reference?
2	Ok?